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Abstract — The exponential increase in dependencies between 
the cyber and physical world leads to an enormous amount of data 
which must be efficiently processed and stored. Therefore, 
computing paradigms are evolving towards machine learning 
(ML)-based systems because of their ability to efficiently and 
accurately process the enormous amount of data. Although ML-
based solutions address the efficient computing requirements of 
big data, they introduce (new) security vulnerabilities into the 
systems, which cannot be addressed by traditional monitoring-
based security measures. Therefore, this paper first presents a 
brief overview of various security threats in machine learning, 
their respective threat models and associated research challenges 
to develop robust security measures. To illustrate the security 
vulnerabilities of ML during training, inferencing and hardware 
implementation, we demonstrate some key security threats on ML 
using LeNet and VGGNet for MNIST and German Traffic Sign 
Recognition Benchmarks (GTSRB), respectively. Moreover, 
based on the security analysis of ML-training, we also propose an 
attack that has a very less impact on the inference accuracy. 
Towards the end, we highlight the associated research challenges 
in developing security measures and provide a brief overview of 
the techniques used to mitigate such security threats.   
Keywords—Machine Learning, Neural Networks, Deep 
Learning, DNNs, Security, Attacks, Attack Surface, Autonomous 
Vehicle, Traffic Sign Detection.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Due to the exponential growth in complex integration and 
interconnection of the physical and cyber domains with humans, the 
number of connected devices increases enormously. Several market 
analysts and corresponding surveys forecast that by 2025, the connected 
devices (20 billion in 2017) will surpass 75 billion [1][2][3], as shown 
in Fig. 1. Although these connected devices are revolutionizing several 
applications domains like healthcare, industrial automation, 
autonomous vehicles, transport systems and many other but they 
generate and collect an enormous amount of data, for example, on 
average, 300 hours of video content is uploaded on YouTube every 
minute [4], 95 million [5] and 300 million [5] photos are uploaded daily 
on Instagram [4] and Facebook [4], respectively, as shown in Fig. 1. 
Moreover, several surveys also predict that by 2025, this data is 
expected to surpass the 160 Zettabyte mark and by 2020, for every 
person on earth, 1.7 MB data will be generated every second [6]. 
Therefore, there is a dire need to efficiently process and store this 
enormous amount of data, which leads to the following fundamental 
research challenges: 
1) How to increase the computing capability to process this data in a 
highly energy-efficient manner?  
2) How to increase the storing capability to store this data in 
interpretable form with minimum energy and area overhead?  
To address these research challenges, researchers have been exploring  
How to efficiently and 
securely process and store this 
enormous amount of data 
while ensuring the privacy?
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Fig. 1: Increasing trend of connected devices and corresponding measured 
data for processing [2] (Source for logos: google images). 
several novel computing architectures, methodologies, frameworks, 
algorithms and tools. However, Machine learning (ML) algorithms, 
especially (deep) neural networks have emerged as one of the most 
popular computing paradigms due to their ability to efficiently handle 
such gigantic amounts of data [3]. ML algorithms not only addressed 
the processing requirements of the huge data but they have also 
revolutionized several application domains, like smart cities, intelligent 
transportation systems, smart grids, autonomous vehicles, healthcare, 
social networks (Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, Instagram, etc.) and 
many more, as shown in Fig. 2, by extracting some of the hidden 
features. 
Autonomous 
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Cancer Detection Natural Language 
Processing
Image 
Classification
Object Detection & 
Localization
Machine 
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Strategy games Forex/Stocks 
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Fig. 2: Applications of Machine Learning Algorithms (Source for images: 
google images). 
Unlike the traditional computing algorithms, ML algorithms 
dynamically change the computational flow with respect to the input 
data, which increases the energy overhead. Moreover, due to the 
unpredictability of the computing in hidden layers of neural networks, 
these algorithms possess several security vulnerabilities which result in 
increased system vulnerability towards security threats [8]-[11]. Some 
example are: Amazon echo hacking [8], Facebook chatbots [8], self-
driving bus crashes (on its very first day in Las Vegas) [13]. These real-
world incidents highlight the security risks involved in ML-based 
systems and raise the fundamental research question: How to securely 
train and implement ML algorithms?  
To address this question, a comprehensive set of vulnerability 
analyses and countermeasures is required. Several techniques for 
security vulnerability analysis and countermeasures have been 
proposed based on the manufacturing/design cycle of ML-based 
systems which is composed of training, hardware implementation of 
trained model (e.g., LeNet and VGGNet trained for MNIST and 
GTSRB dataset) and inference. Since, each stage possesses its own 
security vulnerabilities, their corresponding methodologies for security 
analysis and countermeasures have different impact on ML-based 
systems. For example, traffic sign detection in autonomous vehicles 
requires a sophisticated and powerful pre-processing methodology to 
remove random environmental uncertainties [14]. However, face 
detection inside a highly secure building requires a relatively less 
powerful preprocessing methodology because of the controlled 
environment.  
A. Our Contributions 
 To address these fundamental security challenges in ML, this paper 
makes the following contributions:  
1) A brief yet comprehensive overview of the machine learning security 
including various security threats at different stages (Section II.B) 
and respective threat models (Section II.A). 
2) Associated research challenges to develop robust security measures 
for security threats at different stages of machine learning. 
3) A comprehensive experimental analysis of different security 
vulnerabilities and potential threats during training and inference.   
4) A brief discussion on the possible countermeasures for security 
vulnerabilities in machine learning.   
II. SECURITY  FOR MACHINE LEARNING 
To provide a better understanding of the security for ML-based 
systems, in this section, we provide a comprehensive overview of 
possible threat models and associated security attacks/vulnerabilities 
during the different stages of the design/manufacturing cycle of the 
ML-based systems.    
A. Threat Models 
To develop security measures for ML-based systems, the foremost 
step is to identify the potential threat factors, i.e., attacker, 
design/manufacturing stage, attack mechanism and intention of attack. 
Therefore, a precise threat model should be defined, which provides the 
information about the capabilities and goals of an attacker under 
realistic assumptions. Hence, first we provide a brief overview of the 
manufacturing cycle of ML-based applications/systems.  
The manufacturing/design cycle is defined as all the possible steps 
which are involved in training, testing and deployment of the ML-based 
application/systems, as shown in Fig. 3 [15][17]. Based on the different 
resource requirements and potential application users, the following 
actors are part of the manufacturing/design cycle. 
1) 3rd Party (3P) Cloud Platforms: If the IP providers or 
manufacturers do not have enough computing resources to fulfill 
the requirements of the larger datasets and neural networks, e.g., 
ResNet [16], then 3rd party (3P) cloud platforms are used [17]. 
However, it comes with security vulnerabilities, i.e., IP stealing, 
manipulation of the training dataset and models/architectures. 
Therefore, cloud platforms can be declared as untrusted in the 
following two different cases. 
a) If the cloud platform provider is untrusted, it can manipulate the 
training dataset and baseline neural networks or ML algorithms.  
b) Even if the cloud platform provider is trusted, a man-in-middle 
[18] attack can be performed by another client to steal the IP, 
i.e., the trained network or even to manipulate the IP or affect 
the training process.  
2) IP Providers: The other actor in the manufacturing cycle is the IP 
provider which can also be untrusted because it can poison the 
training datasets and can also manipulate baseline ML 
models/architectures or other hyper-parameters, which are not 
accessible to 3P cloud providers. 
3) Manufacturers: If the manufacturers are untrusted then the 
following security vulnerabilities can be introduced:  
a) Malicious hardware during the hardware implementation.  
b) Side-channel (SC) attacks to steal the IP which can be a trained 
ML algorithm or a dataset. 
c) Trained algorithm by performing local training.  
4) Users: Even after the deployment of the ML-based systems, the 
following security vulnerabilities can still be exploited: 
a) Users can perform side-channel attacks to extract the IP, i.e., 
trained ML algorithm.  
b) During inference, an attacker can also compromise the security 
of the ML-based system by manipulating the inference data or 
their corresponding hardware.   
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Fig. 3: Security threats with respect to different actors involved in the 
manufacturing cycle of ML-based Applications. 
 Thus, based on the trustworthiness of all actors involved in the 
design/manufacturing cycle, there can be 15 possible threat models for 
ML-based systems. For instance, if any of the above-mentioned factors 
are untrusted then it can be considered as a potential threat model. 
B. Security Threats 
 Based on the above-mentioned threat models, each actor can exploit 
or introduce security vulnerabilities in the ML-based system. Therefore, 
for developing security measures, the next step after defining the 
possible threat model is to identify the potential threats, their activation 
methodologies (i.e., data manipulation, malicious hardware and 
software intrusions) and corresponding payloads (i.e., confidence 
reduction (ambiguity in classification), random or targeted 
misclassification). Therefore, with respect to the manufacturing cycle, 
the following possible security threats can be identified.  
1) Training: During training, an attacker can poison the training 
dataset and can also manipulate the tools/architecture/model [15], 
e.g., adding parallel layers or neurons, to perform security attacks, 
as shown in Fig. 4. However, in case of outsourced training, remote 
side-channel or cyber-attacks can be used to steal the IPs.   
2) Hardware Implementation: Similarly, manipulation of the 
hardware implementation of the trained ML model (hardware 
Trojans) and IP stealing (i.e., side-channel, remote cyber-attacks) 
can be performed at hardware level [15], as shown in Fig. 4.  
3) Inference: In this phase, there can be the following types of attacks: 
a) The user can attack (i.e., side-channel, remote cyber-attacks) the 
deployed ML-based system to steal the IP.  
b) Other possible attackers can be in-direct beneficiaries who can 
either manipulate the inference data or intrude the hardware 
[19]. Moreover, attackers can also perform side-channel attacks 
for IP stealing (see Fig. 4). 
Training 
Dataset 
Validation
Dataset 
D
at
a 
A
cq
u
is
it
io
n
 
Training 
V
al
id
at
io
n
Inference DataOutsourced Training
PASS
FAIL
Security Threats
❑ Training Data Poisoning
❑ Parallel Layers/Model
Training
Attacker’ Goals: Confidence Reduction, Random Misclassification, Targeted Misclassification, IP Stealing
Security Threats
❑ Side Channel Attacks
❑ Hardware Intrusions
Hardware Implementation
Security Threats
❑ Inference Data Poisoning
❑ Side Channel Attacks
❑ Hardware Intrusions
Inference/Runtime
Validated
Model
HW 
Design
Validated
Design
C
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
n
1 0 1 1
01110
11011
11101
101
Memory
Data in
Data out
Power 
Supply
Cloud 
Attacks
+ ➔
 
Fig. 4: An Overview of Security Threats/Attacks and their respective 
payloads for Machine Learning Algorithms during Training, Inference, 
and their respective Hardware Implementations [15]. 
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF ML-BASED SYSTEMS 
To illustrate the significance of security vulnerabilities in ML-
based systems, we present a detailed analysis of some of the most 
common security vulnerabilities in ML, i.e., data poisoning (during 
training) and adversarial examples (during inference).  
A. Training Attacks 
 Training is one of the fundamental steps in developing ML-based 
systems and requires a lot of computational resources that encourages 
outsourced training on 3P cloud platforms. However, outsourcing 
comes with security vulnerabilities, i.e., data poisoning, IP (training 
data or trained model) stealing attacks or intrusions in baseline ML 
models/algorithms.  
1) Random Misclassification Attack  
 To demonstrate the security vulnerabilities during the training, we 
demonstrate a random misclassification attack through data poisoning 
in the MNIST [20] dataset during the training of LeNet [21] and in the 
German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmarks (GTSRB) dataset [23] 
during the training of VGGNet [22], respectively. However, to perform 
the data poisoning attack on MNIST and GTSRB, the following 
research challenges need to be addressed: 
1) What is the optimal intensity of data poisoning (noise) to perform 
random misclassification while maintaining the testing/targeted 
accuracy? 
2) What is the optimal number of intruded samples? 
 To address the above-mentioned challenges, we analyzed LeNet for 
MNIST dataset with different number of intruded samples (1% to 40%) 
and with different noise types and intensities (i.e., salt & pepper and 
Gaussian noise), as shown in Fig. 5. The analysis shows that even with 
1% (700/70000) of intruded samples and minimum salt & pepper noise 
(i.e., 10), the Top1 error of the LeNet is 0.8% which is not acceptable 
in testing the LeNet.  
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Fig. 5: Impact of noise intensity (Salt & Pepper and Gaussian) on LeNet 
for MNIST dataset with 1% to 40% intruded number of samples. 
Therefore, to incorporate the effect on inference accuracy, we propose 
an attack which does not intrude the dataset, but it extends the dataset 
with certain malicious samples, as shown inFig. 6. To illustrate the 
effectiveness of this attack, we implement this attack on LeNet and 
VGGNet for MNIST and GTSRB datasets, respectively, and compare 
it with traditional dataset poisoning attacks. 
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Fig. 6: Our experimental setup for random misclassification attacks on 
LeNet and VGGNet for MNIST and GSRB dataset. 
LeNet with MNIST: First, we demonstrate the proposed attack (Attack 
2 in Fig. 6) by training LeNet with only 3% (2100) intruded samples 
that are appended with MNIST. Similarly, we also performed the 
traditional attack (Attack 1 in Fig. 6) in which LeNet was trained on 
MNIST with similar number of intruded samples (3%, i.e., 2100). To 
demonstrate the effectiveness of these attacks, we perform the inference 
on intruded and un-intruded LeNets, as shown in Fig. 7. The analysis 
of these attacks shows that in both attacks the intruded LeNet randomly 
misclassifies the poisoned data sample (with label 0 as 8). However, the 
effect on inference accuracy of the proposed attack (1.3%) is less as 
compared to the traditional data poisoning attack (1.8%), as shown in 
Fig. 7.   
VGGNet with GTSRB:  Similarly, we also performed the proposed 
training data poisoning attack (Attack 2 in Fig. 6) and traditional attack 
(Attack 1 in Fig. 6) on VGGNet with GTSRB, as shown in Fig. 10. 
The experimental analysis shows that the impact of the proposed attack 
on inference accuracy is 20% less than the traditional attacks, as shown 
by the output distribution of 4% Salt & pepper noise in Fig. 10. 
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Fig. 7: Random misclassification attack (i.e., introducing Salt & Pepper 
noise in 3% data samples of the MNIST dataset) on LeNet during the 
training phase. 
 Based on the experimental analysis, we can conclude that randomly 
introduced noise in the training samples can be destructive because it 
reduces the confidence or misclassifies the input data. For example, the 
collision avoidance in autonomous vehicles can be fooled by 
performing the random misclassification which leads to accidents. 
B.  Inference Attacks 
In the development/manufacturing cycle of ML-based systems, like 
the traditional systems, the inference stages of ML algorithms come 
with security vulnerabilities, i.e., manipulation of data acquisition 
block, communication channels and side-channel analysis to 
manipulate the inference data and leaking IP (inference data and 
trained model). Remote cyber-attacks and side-channel attacks come 
with high computational costs and are therefore less frequently used.   
Consequently, to illustrate the impact of security vulnerabilities on 
inference, we demonstrate a couple of inference data poisoning 
attacks, i.e., adversarial examples (Limited-memory Broyden–
Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno (L-BFGS) Method [24][25] and Fast 
Gradient Sign Method (FSGM) [26][27]). In this experimental 
analysis, we consider a threat model in which an attacker has the access 
to the dataset (images) right after the camera, as shown in Fig. 8. 
L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6
Convolutional Layers FC Layers
Input Label 
= Stop
Output Label = 
Speed Limit 
(60km/h)
Modified 
Image  
Fig. 8: Threat model and experimental setup for inference attacks, i.e., 
adversarial examples. 
1) Adversarial Examples 
Based on the threat model (Fig. 8), there can be several possible 
attacks. However, one of the most common attacks is to generate the 
adversarial examples [27][28]. The key goal of any adversarial example 
is to add an imperceptible noise into the data (images) that can force the 
ML algorithm to misclassification. To achieve this goal, an adversarial 
example typically follows the two-step methodology, as discussed 
below and shown in Fig. 9. 
1) In the first step, an attacker chooses the target image/images or target 
output class/classes (in case of targeted misclassification) and 
defines the optimization goals, i.e., correlation coefficients, accuracy 
or other parameters to analyze imperceptibility. 
2) In the second step, a random noise is introduced in the target image 
to compute the imperceptibility based on the defined optimization 
goals. If optimal imperceptibility is achieved, then the intruded 
image is considered as an adversarial image; otherwise, the noise is 
updated based on imperceptibility parameters and a new image is 
generated.  
Target 
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Fig. 9: Basic methodology to generate an adversarial example. 
To analyze the impact of adversarial examples on inference, in this 
paper, we demonstrate two of the most commonly used adversarial 
attacks from the open-source Cleverhans library [29][30], i.e., L-BFGS 
Method [24][25] and Fast Gradient Sign Method (FSGM) [26][27]. 
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Fig. 10: Random misclassification attack, i.e., introducing the salt and pepper noise in German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmarks (GTSR).
basic principle of the L-BFGS method is to achieve the optimization 
goal as defined in Equation 1. 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 ‖𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒‖2  →  𝑓(𝑥 + 𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒)  ≠  𝑓(𝑥)   (1) 
 Where, noise represents the perturbations and minimizing it 
represents its imperception. To illustrate the effectiveness of this 
method, we demonstrated this attack on the VGGNet trained on the 
GTSRB, as shown in Fig. 11. This experimental analysis shows that by 
introducing adversarial noise to the image, the input is misclassified, 
i.e., from a stop sign to speed limit 60km/h.  
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Fig. 11: An adversarial image generated by L-BFGS Method. 
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FSGM): Although the L-BFGS method 
generates adversarial examples with imperceptible noise, it utilizes a 
basic linear search algorithm to update the noise for optimization which 
makes it computationally expensive and slow [26]. Therefore, 
Goodfellow et al. proposed a Fast Gradient Sign Method to generate 
adversarial examples which is faster and requires less computations as 
it performs one step gradient update along the direction of the sign of 
gradient at each pixel [27]. Their proposed imperceptive noise can be 
defined as:    
𝜂 =  𝜖 𝛻𝑥 𝐽(𝜃, 𝑥, 𝑓)   (2) 
 Where, 𝜖 and 𝜂  are the magnitude of the perturbation and the 
imperceptible noise, respectively. J is the cost minimizing function 
(based on original image x, classification function f and cost with 
respect to target class 𝜃) obtained through stochastic gradient descent. 
The generated adversarial example can be computed by adding 𝜂 into 
the targeted image. To analyze this vulnerability, we demonstrated this 
attack on VGGNet trained on GTSRB, as shown in Fig. 12.  
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Fig. 12: An adversarial image generated by Fast Gradient Sign Method. In 
this experiment, we assume the value for “ 𝝐 ” is 0.007 to make it 
imperceptible, as mentioned in [27]. 
IV. RESEARCH CHALLENGES FOR DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF ML-BASED SYSTEM/APPLICATIONS 
Based on the above-mentioned security threats/vulnerabilities 
(Section II.B), the following research challenges need to be addressed 
for developing secure/robust ML-based systems:  
1) How to securely generate the training dataset and ensure its privacy 
(especially, in outsourced design/implementation)?  
2) How to obfuscate the training dataset and hyper-parameters of the 
underlying ML algorithm to ensure privacy during the outsourced 
training period? 
3) How to ensure the security of the data acquisition during the 
inference stage?  
4) How to ensure the security of the pre-processing, ML algorithm and 
post processing hardware implementation? 
5) How to validate the correctness and fairness of the ML hardware 
implementation of the trained ML model? 
6) How to protect and obfuscate the IPs (i.e., trained ML model, 
dataset) from IP stealing attacks, i.e., side channel, remote cyber-
attacks, shared cache attacks? 
7) How to securely execute ML algorithms on third-party hardware 
accelerators? 
V. COUNTERMEASURES FOR SECURITY VULNERABILITIES IN 
MACHINE LEARNING  
To address the above-mentioned challenges (Section IV), several 
countermeasures have been proposed, i.e., interactive proof (SafetyNets 
[33][34]), privacy-preserving predictions (SecureML [31], DeepNano 
[32]), encryption of dataset and trained ML models (CryptoNets [36]), 
classifier protections etc. In this section, we briefly discuss the several 
possible countermeasures.  
Table 1 shows the summary of the potential security vulnerabilities 
and their corresponding countermeasures. Based on the manufacturing 
cycles, these countermeasures can be classified into the following three 
categories: 
Table 1: Summary of the potential security attacks and respective possible 
countermeasures with respect to manufacturing/design cycle. 
 
Security 
Vulnerabilities 
Potential Countermeasures 
T
ra
in
in
g
 
Training Data 
Manipulation 
• Data Encryption, 
• Redundant Outsourced Training 
• Transfer Learning (local training of trained 
model which is obtained by outsourced training) 
Cloud IP 
Stealing 
Attacks 
• Data Encryption 
• Baseline ML-Model Obfuscation 
• HW/SW Side-channel Analysis 
• Online communication monitors 
• Cyber Security Measures 
H
W
 I
m
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
  
Hardware 
Trojans 
• Online Monitoring 
• HW/SW Side-channel Analysis 
• Formal Verification and validation of hardware 
implementation 
• Online property checkers 
SC- IP Stealing 
• HW/SW Side-channel Analysis 
• SC parameter-based runtime monitoring setup 
• Online property checkers 
Cyber-Attacks 
for IP Stealing 
• Online communication monitors 
• Cyber Security Measures 
In
fe
r
en
c
e 
Inference Data 
Manipulation  
• Data Encryption 
• Sophisticated Pre-processing 
HW/SW IP 
stealing 
Attacks 
• Online communication monitors 
• Cyber Security Measures 
• HW/SW Side-channel Analysis 
• SC parameter-based runtime monitoring setup 
1) Training: Depending upon the targeted vulnerabilities and 
corresponding methodologies, there are several possible 
countermeasures:  
a) Encryption: In this approach, the training dataset set is 
encrypted before training (local/outsource), i.e., cryptoNets 
[36][37][38]. However, this countermeasure comes with 
additional hardware for encrypting the inference dataset.  
b) Transfer Learning-based Local Training: To mitigate the 
manipulations of weight/model, the dataset is split into two 
parts, one for outsourced training and other one is to locally train 
the model, which can be used to overwrite the outsourced 
trained weights/model by performing the transfer learning 
[39][40].  
c) Redundant Training: To mitigate the manipulation of trained 
model/data, the training is outsourced to multiple 3P cloud 
platforms. Triple/multi-modular redundancy is used to identify 
the intrusions while testing [41].  
2) Hardware Implementation: Hardware intrusions in ML-based 
systems are similar to traditional hardware-attacks, therefore, 
typical hardware security techniques can be applied, i.e., runtime 
anomaly detection using side-channel and communication analysis, 
formal method-based analysis ([42]-[44]), and traditional 
obfuscation techniques to mitigate hardware IP stealing. 
3) Inference: Similarly, traditional obfuscation techniques, runtime 
anomaly detection, side channel analysis and security measures for 
remote cyber-attacks [45] can be applied to mitigate the IP stealing. 
data, trained model and hardware manipulation. Development and 
selection of appropriate security measures for inference is a very 
complex and tedious process because of the system’s energy and 
design constraints, especially in battery operated components of a 
CPS [46]. For example, to avoid the data poisoning attacks, 
encryption is one of the possible countermeasures, but due to 
limited energy resources applicability of this is limited.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we first discuss and identify the possible security 
threats in machine learning with respect to threat models, attack 
methodologies and payloads. Moreover, to analyze the security 
vulnerabilities for identifying the potential countermeasures, we 
demonstrate some of the security threats (Training data poisoning and 
adversrial examples (L-BFGS and FSGM)) on the LeNet and the 
VGGNet for the MNIST and the German Traffic Sign Recognition 
Benchmarks (GTSRB), respectively. We also propose a training data 
poisoning attack which has relatively less impact on inference accuracy. 
Finally, we provide an overview of possible security measures and 
highlight respective research challenges in developing these security 
measures.   
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